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Abstract
The great majority of studies on the effect of school quality on academic outcomes do
not take account of changes in student choices concerning effort if school quality, e.g.
class size, changes. We show that empirical estimates of the ‘total’ effect of changes in
school quality could be quite different from the ‘partial’ effect holding other inputs
(including student effort) constant. The main parameters governing this difference are
the extent to which inputs in the education production function are substitutes or
complements and how kinked is the benefit from a higher mark. The difference
depends also on student ability, the student’s distaste for effort and the curvature of
the education production with respect to effort.
JEL classification: I21; I28
Keywords: Educational economics; Human capital; Effect of school quality;
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1 Introduction
The majority of studies on the effect of ‘school quality’ on academic outcomes do not
take account of changes in student choices concerning effort when school quality, e.g.
class size or teacher quality, changes.1 In particular, students might respond to changes in
their school quality by adjusting the time and effort devoted to study (with a consequent
change in leisure or market work). Thus, the ‘partial’ effects of school quality on academic
outcomes corresponding to production function parameters may differ from empirical
estimates of the ‘total’ effects (which include effects via effort response). This is similar
to the distinction between production function parameters and average policy effects in
Todd andWolpin (2003) where family inputs are allowed to respond to changes in school
quality.
From a policy point of view, both the total and partial effects of an increase in school
quality are of interest. The total effect on student achievement is of course important
for policy makers: An intervention aimed at improving student academic outcomes will
typically be considered a success if the goal is achieved, and a failure otherwise (irre-
spective of specific mechanisms, including possible effort response). However, the partial
effect on achievement (holding effort constant) is also important, since it provides knowl-
edge of education production function parameters and the mechanisms through which
an intervention works (or why it does not work). Furthermore, if students respond to
an intervention which increases school quality by reducing time and effort devoted to
study, benefit-cost analysis that only have total effects as benefit will underestimate ‘full’
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benefits. These include, inter alia, more leisure, increased earnings from market work
and less need for intervention by parents. In the formal model of this paper we focus on
educational outcomes and student leisure, but benefits are much wider than that.
Empirical estimates of class size effects are often rather small and insignificant. Reasons
for this may be non-random sorting of students into schools and that schools reduce class
size when students are more ‘disruptive’ (Lazear 2001). Another explanation may be that
students typically reduce effort in response to a reduction in class size.
A few papers model and estimate the response of parental inputs to changes in school
quality. Houtenville and Conway (2008) consider a theoretical model in which student
achievement depends on parental effort and school resources, and parents maximize util-
ity, which is a function of student achievement, leisure and consumption, subject to time
and budget constraints. In this model, an increase in school resources may induce par-
ents to increase or reduce their effort depending on the form of the utility and production
functions. Their empirical analysis indicates that parental effort and per-student spend-
ing have positive effects on student achievement, and that some measures of parental
effort are affected negatively by per-student spending. However, the estimated effect of
per-student spending on achievement is not affected by whether or not parental effort is
included in the model. A similar result is found in Datar and Mason (2008): controlling
for parental involvement does not change estimated effects of class size on test scores
for children in kindergarten and first grade. Bonesrønning (2004) finds zero or positive
effects on parental effort of reducing class size. Das et al. (2011) consider a dynamic
household optimization model where child test scores depend on school and household
inputs. Assuming that households make decisions regarding their own inputs before they
know the amount of school inputs, they are only able to respond to anticipated changes in
school inputs. Using data from Zambia and India the authors find that household school
expenditure is reduced when anticipated school grants are increased, and that anticipated
grants have no effect on student test scores whereas unanticipated grants have significant
positive effects.
Only very few papers consider models of student response to changes in school quality.
In the theoretical model of De Fraja et al. (2010) student effort, parental effort and school
effort are simultaneously determined as a Nash equilibrium. In this very general model,
a change in an exogenous variable, e.g. an increase in school resources, may increase or
reduce the equilibrium level of effort of students (and parents and schools) depending on
the form of the utility and education production functions and the values of exogenous
variables. In their empirical analysis, the measure of student effort is based on (a factor
analysis of ) general attitude variables such as whether students like school, whether they
think homework is boring and whether they want to leave school. The authors do not
find any significant effect of class size on their measure of student effort, but they do
find that student effort is reduced when ‘school effort’ is increased, where school effort
is based on (a factor analysis of mainly) whether streaming and disciplinary methods are
used. They find that student and parental effort are positively correlated (where parental
effort is based on a factor analysis of mainly the teacher’s opinion of parents’ interest in
their child’s education) and that class size has no effect on parental effort. The attitudinal
variables used by De Fraja et al. (2010) may be poor proxies for effort or time spent on
homework, and they may not be expected to be much affected by (marginal) changes in
school resources. Furthermore, the authors ignore the important issue of the endogeneity
2014, 3:2
http://www.izajole.com/content/3/1/2
Browning and Heinesen IZA Journal of Labor Economics Page 3 of 16
of class size and assume observed class size variation to be exogenous. These problems
may explain why they do not find any effect of class size on their measure of student effort.
Using quasi-experimental variation in class size, a recent study estimates student and
parental response to class size in grades 4-6 (Fredriksson P, Öckert N, Oosterbeek H:
Inside the black box of class size effects: Behavioral responses to class size variation,
unpublished). Their measures of student effort are time spent on homework and reading
outside school. In their theoretical model (based on Albornoz F, Berlinski S, Cabrales A:
Motivation, resources and the organization of the school system, unpublished), the edu-
cation production function determines student skills as the product of student ability and
student effort, so class size only affects student skills through student effort. They assume
that student utility depends on student effort and ‘rewards to effort’ which are determined
by parents’ and teachers’ utility maximizing behaviour. In their model, class size always
has a negative effect on student effort, but a non-negative effect on parental effort. In this
paper we consider a theoretical parametric model which includes a more general educa-
tion production function and a more flexible student utility function, which depends on
an educational outcome and effort, in order to analyse how student response to a change
in school quality may depend on the values of important parameters of the production
and utility functions. We ignore parental response to a change in school quality. This
simplification is more appropriate when considering older students (e.g. 15-year-olds).
Some papers estimating the effects of course-specific (or subject-specific) school qual-
ity inputs on student academic outcomes provide indirectly an indication that students’
change of effort in response to changes in school quality may be important. Aaronson
et al. (2007) estimate the effect of teacher quality and find, e.g., statistically significant
effects of mathematics teachers on mathematics test scores, but also significant effects of
English teachers on mathematics test scores (and of mathematics teachers on English test
scores). Heinesen (2010) estimates significant negative effects of subject-specific class size
on examinationmarks in the same subject, but the results also indicate negative effects on
marks in other subjects. One interpretation of the effects of subject-specific school inputs
on student outcomes in other subjects is that they are due to spill-over effects between
subjects induced by student reallocation of effort between subjects.
In this paper we consider simple parametric models with endogenous student effort
and show that students’ responses to changes in their school quality could imply quite
large differences between total and partial effects on academic outcomes of changes in
school quality and could lead to empirical estimates of total effects which are either larger
or smaller than corresponding partial effects. The main parameters governing the sign of
the difference between total and partial effects are shown to be the extent of substitution
in the education production function and how kinked is the benefit from a higher mark.
The absolute value of the difference also depends on the student’s distaste for effort, the
curvature of the ‘production’ of the final mark with respect to effort and the student’s
ability in the course of study. Our main conclusion is that reliable estimates of the partial
effect of school quality on academic outcomes requires information on academic effort,
including time use. This suggests a new round of data collection.
2 The basic idea
We begin with an illustration of the basic idea. Assume that an educational outcome
(e.g. test scores or examination marks) is a concave function of student effort for a
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fixed level of school quality, and that student utility is increasing in the educational
outcome and decreasing in effort. For a given level of school quality, students choose
effort, and thereby (ignoring uncertainty) the educational outcome, to maximize util-
ity. If school quality increases, education production possibilities increase for each level
of effort. This is illustrated in Figure 1 for four different cases of production and util-
ity functions. In each panel of Figure 1 the concave curves represent the education
production functions before and after the increase in school quality (solid and dashed
lines, respectively), and the convex curves are student indifference curves. The points
marked by A are the initial utility maximizing choices of effort and outcome, and points
marked by B are the corresponding choices after the increase in school quality. The
‘partial’ effect of an increase in school quality is given by the vertical shift of the produc-
tion function at point A (i.e., holding effort fixed at its initial optimal level). However,
the upward shift in the production function implies that students may obtain a higher
outcome with less effort. This ‘income effect’ tends to reduce effort. The substitu-
tion effect may enhance the negative effort response if the marginal product of effort
decreases when school quality increases, or it may work in the other direction if effort
and school quality are complements in production. Of course, the optimal response
of students also depends on the form of the utility function. The two left panels of
Figure 1 illustrate cases where effort is reduced (more so in the upper panel) imply-
ing that the total effect on the educational outcome is smaller than the partial effect.
In the upper right panel, effort is unchanged (no difference between total and par-
tial effect), and in the lower right panel effort is increased (the total effect exceeds the
partial effect).
Figure 1 Education production relations between outcome and student effort for two different levels
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3 A parametric model
To fix ideas we consider a parametric model. We begin with the simplest case in which a
student takes only one course.2 The outcome is a mark y. This mark is the result of school
quality, s, student ability, μ, and student effort, h. 3 To make our main points as cleanly
as possible we ignore uncertainty and take a simple parameterisation for the production
function:
y = sλ + μhη + sλμhη (1)
Student effort and school quality are normalized so that 0 < h < 1 and 0 < s ≤ 1. The
parameters η and λ capture the curvature in the output with respect to student effort and
school quality, respectively, and measures the degree of substitution or complementarity
of the two inputs. To ensure that production is increasing and concave in both we assume
that 0 < λ < 1, 0 < η < 1,  > −1 and  ≥ − (μ¯)−1 , where μ¯ is the maximum value of
μ. If  < 0 then s and h are substitutes in production, and if  > 0 they are complements.
To motivate this function, note that education production may be considered to consist
of two learning processes, learning at school (represented by the term sλ) and learning at
home doing homework (represented by μhη), and an interaction effect between the two
processes represented by the last term in (1). The marginal effect of school resources may
be smaller for well-prepared/high-ability students ( < 0) if the primary goal of teaching
is to ensure that all students obtain a basic level of skills. Also, the marginal effect of effort
(and ability) may be smaller when school resources are high: when the learning process
at school is more effective there may be smaller returns to effort at home to learning the
curriculum. In conventional production functions including the Cobb-Douglas and CES
functions, inputs are complements, i.e. themarginal product of one input (e.g. h) increases
when the amount of the other input (s) is increased. However, as argued above, h and s
may be substitutes in production, so that the marginal product of h is reduced when s
increases, and vice versa.4
In empirical studies a parameter of interest is the partial elasticity of the outcome with
respect to school quality, holding effort constant:
 = ∂ ln y
∂ ln s |h (2)
Note that in the parameterisation (1) the partial elasticity is not independent of effort and
student ability. The same is true for the corresponding derivative ∂y/∂s, unless  = 0. If
effort is fixed then we can recover the partial elasticity from observing variation in y due
to experimental variation in s.
Typically neither experimental nor non-experimental studies of effects of school quality
have access to data on student effort or time use, and therefore the interpretation of esti-
mated effects as education production function parameters presumes that effort is fixed.
However, it is perfectly reasonable to assume that some students might respond to the
change in constraints with adjustment in effort expended. To capture this, let preferences
be represented by the utility function:
u = y
1−σ
1 − σ + δ ln (1 − h) (3)
where the maximum time available for study is normalised to unity (as noted above).5
The parameter δ captures the taste for leisure and the parameter σ (> 0) captures the
2014, 3:2
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curvature in the concern about the outcome; higher values of σ give a more kinked ben-
efit function. That is, for higher values of σ the student will have a high return below a
threshold value of y (‘passing’) and a low return above.




the total elasticity is given by:
ˆ = d ln yˆd ln s (4)
Just as the partial elasticity is a parameter of interest in empirical studies, so is the total
elasticity, which may be recovered by observing variation in the outcome (including vari-
ation via effort response) due to experimental variation in s. However, in general, the total
elasticity will not be equal to the partial elasticity . We define the elasticity difference as
	 = ˆ −  (5)
The sign of the elasticity difference will depend on the sign of the effort elasticity,
∂ ln hˆ/∂ ln s. Clearly the elasticity difference 	 will be positive (ˆ > ) if the student
responds to the increase in school quality by putting in more effort, and it will be negative
if the effort elasticity is negative. If s and h are substitutes in production ( ≤ 0) the effort
elasticity and the elasticity difference are negative. But if they are complements ( > 0)
the marginal product of effort is increased when school quality increases, and therefore it
may be optimal for the student to increase effort. Whether it is in fact optimal to increase
effort depends on the size of  and the other parameters of the model, especially the cur-
vature of the benefit function with respect to the outcome (σ ). Thus, even if s and h are
complements it may still be optimal to reduce effort because of the ‘income effect’: an
increase in s enables students to obtain a larger y with less effort (more leisure).
First, we show that the effort elasticity (and therefore the elasticity difference) is nega-
tive if σ > 1 or  ≤ 0. The marginal effect of school quality on effort is found by inserting







= λsλ−1μηhη−1y−σ [ (1 − σ) − σy−1]
∂2u
∂ hˆ2
= μηhη−2(1 + sλ)y−σ [ (η − 1) − σy−1μηhη(1 + sλ)]− δ
(1 − h)2 < 0 (6)
Thus, the sign of ∂ hˆ/∂s is equal to the sign of ∂2u/∂ hˆ∂s. It is obvious that ∂ hˆ/∂s < 0 if
( ≤ 0 and σ < 1) or if ( ≥ 0 and σ > 1). However, ∂ hˆ/∂s is also negative when  < 0
and σ > 1. Thus, when  < 0 and σ > 1 we have
∂2u
∂ hˆ∂s
< 0 ⇔ (1 − σ) − σ(sλ + μhη + sλμhη)−1 < 0 (7)




This inequality always holds given the assumed restrictions on the parameters. The RHS
of the inequality tends towards its lower limit max(1,μ) from above when σ → ∞ and
 = max(−1,−1/μ). It is easy to show that: (a) for  = max(−1,−1/μ) the LHS of (8) is
always less than or equal to max(1,μ); (b) when max(−1,−1/μ) <  < 0 the inequality
2014, 3:2
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(8) also holds (the derivative of the LHS with respect to  is smaller than the derivative of
the RHS). Thus, ∂ hˆ/∂s < 0 if  ≤ 0 or σ > 1.
We now examine further the determinants of the direction and size of the elasticity dif-
ference	. Although simple, the parametric model does not yield closed form expressions
for the elasticities of interest. We therefore have to resort to simulations to illustrate how
they vary with the parameters. Without loss of generality we can take λ = 0.4.6
We take a grid over the values given in Table 1 (and calculate the elasticities at s = 1).7
These values are, of course, wholly arbitrary and serve only to illustrate the variation in
the elasticity difference. Since the maximum value of μ is here equal to 10, concavity is
ensured when  ≥ −0.1. For each set of parameter values, the partial elasticity is cal-
culated holding h fixed at the optimal level given the parameters and the initial level of
school quality, whereas the total elasticity is calculated letting h adjust to its new optimal
level induced by the increase in s.
With this range of parameter values the minimum andmaximum of the elasticity differ-
ence 	 are −0.12 and 0.00, respectively. Thus, even when  attains its maximum value of
the grid (0.075) 	 is not positive for any combination of the other parameters within the
grid of Table 1. Table 2 shows that the parameter values that induce the extreme values of
	 are very different. As expected, the largest negative value of 	 is obtained when s and
h are strong substitutes in production ( attains its minimum). Also, 	 is more negative
if the benefit function is more curved (high σ ), if the student has a higher taste for leisure
(high δ), if the elasticity of output with respect to effort is high (high η), and/or if student
ability (μ) is relatively low (although in this case not at its minimum).
When s and h are strong complements in production 	 may be substantially positive.
This is illustrated in Table 3 where  is fixed at 2. Here the largest negative value of 	 is
obtained for about the same values of (μ, δ, σ , η) as in Table 2 (except that μ is 2 instead
of 3), whereas the largest positive value of 	 (0.055) is obtained for the same parameter
values except that σ (the curvature of the benefit function) is at its minimum instead of
its maximum.8
Within any school, we would expect that the parameters (μ, δ, σ , η, ) are heteroge-
neous. For example, how important it is to attain more than a simple ‘passing’ grade
will vary from student to student, implying heterogeneity in the parameter σ . Moreover,
the distributions of these parameters may not be independent. For example, high ability
students (high μ) who aspire to further education may have a lower concern for simply
passing.
4 Differential effects
The results of Summers and Wolfe (1977), Krueger (1999), Angrist and Lavy (1999),
Browning and Heinesen (2007) and Heinesen (2010) indicate that reducing class size
Table 1 Simulation parameter values
Parameter Minimum Maximum Grid step
μ 1 10 1
δ 0.5 2.0 0.1
σ 0.45 1.95 0.1
η 0.1 0.6 0.1
 −0.075 0.075 0.025
2014, 3:2
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Table 2 Extreme values of the difference between total and partial elasticities
Partial Total Diff. Parameters
elasticity elasticity  μ δ σ η 
0.249 0.125 −0.124 3 2.0 1.95 0.6 −0.075
0.062 0.062 −0.000 10 0.5 0.45 0.1 0.075
has larger positive effects for students from disadvantaged backgrounds, and Heinesen
(2010) also finds that low-ability students benefit significantly more than high-ability stu-
dents. Aaronson et al. (2007) find that teacher-quality effects are relatively larger for
lower-ability students.
The simple model described above is consistent with these findings since the total elas-
ticity, ˆ, is decreasing in student ability, μ. The absolute value of the total effect of school
resources on marks (dyˆ/ds) is also decreasing in μ for many combinations of values for
the other parameters. When  = 0 (i.e., s and h are neither substitutes nor comple-
ments in production), the derivative ∂y/∂s in the production function (1) holding h fixed
does not depend on μ. However, the total effect ∂ yˆ/∂s depends on μ because students
respond to changes in school quality by changing effort. This is illustrated in Figure 2
which shows how ˆ and dyˆ/ds vary with μ in the model consisting of (3) and (1) where
(δ, σ , η) = (1.0, 1.05, 0.4). In the lower part of the figure  = 0, and the lower right panel
shows that dyˆ/ds is decreasing in μ. The lower left panel shows that the total elasticity
decreases much more in μ. This is not surprising since y determined by the production
function (1) holding h fixed and also the optimal value yˆ are strongly increasing inμ. In the
upper part of the figure  = −0.05 (i.e., s and h are substitutes in production). Whereas
the total elasticity varies withμ in much the same way in the two parts of the figure, dyˆ/ds
decreases much more in the upper part of the figure, where s and h are substitutes, than
in the lower part.
Figure 3 illustrates differential effects with respect to the parameters of the utility func-
tion, i.e. the curvature with respect to the educational outcome (σ ) and the taste for leisure
(δ), given constant values of student ability (μ = 5) and the curvature of the production
function with respect to effort (η = 0.4). In the special case where  = 0, school quality
(s) and effort (h) are neither substitutes nor complements in production, and the deriva-
tive with respect to s in the production function, holding h constant, is equal to λsλ−1,
i.e. independent of the initial levels of h and y. Assuming λ = 0.4 and s = 1 as above
and considering a 10% increase of s, the partial effect on y is 0.04. This is represented by
the horizontal line in the upper left panel of Figure 3, whereas the two downward slop-
ing curves in this panel show the total effects for δ = 0.5 (solid line) and δ = 2 (dashed
line), respectively. Whereas the partial effect is constant, the total effect is decreasing in
Table 3 Extreme values of the difference between total and partial elasticities when school
quality and effort are strong complements (rho=2)
Partial Total Diff. Parameters
elasticity elasticity  μ δ σ η 
0.326 0.217 −0.109 2 2.0 1.95 0.6 2
0.299 0.354 0.055 2 2.0 0.45 0.6 2
2014, 3:2
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Figure 2 Total elasticity and absolute change in outcome when school resources are increased by
10%. The two upper panels are for rho = −0.05, the two lower panels are for rho = 0.
both σ and δ. When both σ and δ are small (about 0.5) the total effect is about 6% smaller
than the partial effect; the difference is about 12% if instead δ is large (2); and it is about
40% if σ is large (1.95). The upper right panel of Figure 3 shows the corresponding rela-
tionship between the elasticity difference 	 and σ for the two extreme values of δ (and
again for  = 0). The numerical value of the elasticity difference increases in both σ and
δ, and it is about −0.07 when both parameters are large (about 2) and in this case the
partial elasticity is 0.16. The relation between the elasticity difference and the utility func-
tion parameters is almost the same when  = −0.05, i.e. when s and h are substitutes in
production; see the lower left panel. The lower right panel shows the relation when s and
h are strong complements ( = 2): when σ is small the elasticity difference is positive
(h increases in response to the increase in s), and more so when δ is large; but when σ is
large the elasticity difference is negative and large numerically (of about the same size as
when  = 0 or  = −0.05).
5 A pass/fail mark
If in this simple model the curvature parameter in the utility function is above a threshold
(σ > 1), students respond to an increase in school quality by decreasing their effort.
Conversely, if σ < 1 (and  > 0), students may in some cases respond by increasing their
effort. To investigate in more detail the effect of the curvature of the benefit function we
consider an extreme case in which:
u = I (y ≥ y∗)+ δ ln (1 − h) (9)
2014, 3:2
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Figure 3 Differential effects with respect to parameters of the utility function: Total and partial
effects and elasticity differences.
where I (y ≥ y∗) is an indicator function that takes value unity if y ≥ y∗ and zero otherwise
(with y∗ > sλ). This corresponds to a pass/fail mark. In this case students will either set:
h = 0 ⇒ u = 0
h =




⇒ u = 1 + δ ln
⎛
⎝1 −






where we assume that the passing grade is attainable for some feasible level of effort:
















This illustrates that, ceteris paribus, a pass grade is more likely if complementarity in
production, student ability or school quality are high or if the student has a low taste for
leisure.9 For a given level of school quality we have three groups of students: bad fails;
marginal fails (students who failed but were close to choosing to pass) and passes. If we
increase school quality then the bad fails continue to exert no effort and fail, the marginal
fails increase their effort (the level given in (10) with the new level of s) and pass students
reduce their effort and still pass. Thus we have three different responses to the policy
change: negative, zero and positive.
6 More than one course of study
As we discussed in the introduction, results in papers using course- or subject-specific
variation in school quality indicate that students’ effort response may be important. Thus,
2014, 3:2
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Aaronson et al. (2007) find significant effects of, e.g., both math and English teachers on
math test scores, and Heinesen (2010) finds significant negative effects of course-specific
class size on marks in the same course, but also indication of negative effects on marks in
other courses. One possible mechanism which may explain these cross-course effects (or
spill-over effects between courses) is student reallocation of effort between subjects. This
may be illustrated by an extension of the abovemodel framework to the more general case
withmore than one course of study. For simplicity, consider the case with two courses.We





1 − σ +
y1−σ2
1 − σ + δ ln (1 − h1 − h2) (12)
where yi and hi are the outcome (a mark) and student effort in subject i, respectively.
We allow student ability (μi) to differ between subjects, but for simplicity we assume
that the other parameters in the two subject-specific production functions are identical,
and we assume their form to be similar to (1):
yi = sλi + μihηi + sλi μihηi , i = 1, 2 (13)
Denoting the optimal choices by (hˆ1, hˆ2, yˆ1, yˆ2) we may consider four total elasticities,
namely elasticities of the two outcomes with respect to each of the two school quality
inputs:
ˆii = d ln yˆid ln si , i = 1, 2 (14)
ˆij = d ln yˆid ln sj , i, j = 1, 2, i 	= j (15)
The two total ‘own resource’ elasticities in (14) consist of a direct effect of increased school
resources in subject i on academic outcome in the same subject and an indirect effect
through changed effort in subject i. The two total cross-elasticities (15) are different from
zero if an increase in school resources in one subject induces students to change effort in
the other subject. The partial own-resource elasticities, ii = ∂ ln yi/∂ ln si, consist of only
the direct effect, holding effort fixed. The partial cross-elasticities, ij = ∂ ln yi/∂ ln sj, i 	=
j, are zero. The sign of each of the four elasticity differences 	ij = ˆij − ij (i, j = 1, 2) is
equal to the sign of the corresponding effort elasticity ∂ ln hˆi/∂ ln sj.
As in the model with only one course of study, the signs of the elasticity differences are
mainly determined by the signs of σ and . Thus, we now show that dhˆi/dsi < 0 and
dhˆi/dsj > 0 (i, j = 1, 2; i 	= j) if σ > 1 or  ≤ 0. To see this, we insert the production


































= λsλ−1i μiηhη−1i y−σi [ (1 − σ) − σy−1i ]
∂2v
∂ hˆ2i
= Ai − δ




(1 − h1 − h2)2
Ai = μiηhη−2i (1 + sλi )y−σi [ (η − 1) − σy−1i μiηhηi (1 + sλi )] (17)
Since Ai < 0, we have ∂2v/∂ hˆ2i < 0. Furthermore, D = A1A2 − (A1 + A2)δ/(1 − h1 −
h2)2 > 0. Thus, ∂ hˆi/∂si < 0 and ∂ hˆi/∂sj > 0 iff (1 − σ) − σy−1i < 0, and this inequality
holds if σ > 1 or  ≤ 0 by arguments similar to the one-course case.
If we take a grid over the same values of the parameters as given in Table 1, where now
both μ1 and μ2 vary between 1 and 10, we obtain the extreme values of the elasticity dif-
ferences	11 = ˆ11−11 and	12 = ˆ12 and the associated parameters shown in Table 4.10
The ‘own resource’ elasticity difference 	11 has extreme values −0.12 and −0.00, and the
same is true for 	22 (not shown in the table since the model is symmetric in the two
courses). The elasticity difference 	11 (and 	22) vary with the parameters in basically the
same way as 	 in the one-course case (except for the dependence on ability in the other
subject): The extreme negative value is obtained when σ , δ and η are at their maximum,
when  is at its minimum, and when ability in the two subjects is low (although not at
the minimum); the maximum value (zero) is obtained when when σ , δ and η are at their
minimum, when  is at its maximum, and when ability is at its maximum in the same
subject and at its minimum in the other subject. The two cross elasticities ˆ12 and ˆ21
have extreme values −0.00 and 0.05. The extreme positive value of ˆ12 is obtained when
σ , η and μ1 are at their maximum values, and when , δ and μ2 are at their minimum
values. Thus, the elasticity of outcome in one subject with respect to school resources in
the other subject is high when  is negative and numerically large, σ is high, ability in the
first subject is high and ability in the other subject is low. The minimum of ˆ12 is obtained
when  = 0 and when σ , δ, μ1 and μ2 are high, and η is low.
Table 5 illustrates that when school quality and student effort are strong complements
in production ( = 2 in the table) then the elasticity difference of 	11 may be substan-
tially positive (as for 	 in the model with a single subject) and ˆ12 may be substantially
negative. The maximum of 	11 is obtained when σ and δ are small and η and μ1 and μ2
are high. The minimum of ˆ12 is obtained for the same parameter values, except that μ1
Table 4 Extreme values of differences between total and partial elasticities in model with
two courses of study
Partial Total Diff. Parameters
elasticity elasticity μ1 μ2 δ σ η 
11 ˆ11 	11
0.253 0.131 −0.121 2 2 2.0 1.95 0.6 −0.075
0.049 0.049 −0.000 10 1 0.5 0.45 0.1 0.075
12 ˆ12 	12
0.0 −0.001 −0.001 9 10 2.0 1.95 0.1 0.000
0.0 0.052 0.052 10 1 0.5 1.95 0.6 −0.075
2014, 3:2
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Table 5 Extreme values of differences between total and partial elasticities in model with
two courses of study when school quality and effort are strong complements (rho= 2)
Partial Total Diff. Parameters
elasticity elasticity μ1 μ2 δ σ η 
11 ˆ11 	11
0.237 0.169 −0.068 10 10 0.5 1.95 0.6 2
0.210 0.308 0.098 10 10 0.5 0.45 0.6 2
12 ˆ12 	12
0.0 −0.069 −0.069 3 10 0.5 0.45 0.6 2
0.0 0.032 0.032 10 1 0.5 1.85 0.6 2
is small. However, Table 5 also shows that when σ is large, 	11 may be substantially neg-
ative and ˆ12 may be substantially positive even when s and h are strong complements in
production.
Figure 4 shows how the total elasticities ˆij and the absolute change in the outcomes
Dyˆij, which is the increase in yˆi when sj is increased by 10%, vary with ability in subject 1
when (μ2, δ, σ , η, ) = (5, 0.5, 1.95, 0.6,−0.05). Thus, the values of δ, σ and η are chosen
so that the cross elasticities are relatively large. The own-subject elasticity ˆ11 and the
absolute change Dyˆ11 are decreasing in μ1 corresponding to the results in the one-subject
case. The other own-subject elasticity ˆ22 (andDyˆ22) do not dependmuch onμ1, while the
cross elasticity ˆ21 (andDyˆ21) are decreasing inμ1, and ˆ12 (andDyˆ12) are increasing inμ1.
The figure illustrates that the cross elasticities may be rather large compared to the own-
subject elasticities. For instance, when μ1 = 5 the cross elasticities are about one third
of the own-subject elasticities. Thus, when school resources in one course is changed,
this may have substantial effects on outcomes also in other courses, and the mechanism
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behind these cross effects in this simple model is students’ reallocation of effort between
subjects: When school resources in one course increase it may be optimal for students to
reduce effort in this course and increase leisure and effort in the other course. In Figure 4
 = −0.05 so that si and hi are assumed to be substitutes in production. Setting  equal
to zero produces a rather similar figure although the cross elasticities are a little smaller
compared to the own-course elasticities (for μ1 = 5 the ratio is 0.27). Assuming inputs
to be strong complements in production implies that the ratios of cross elasticities to
own-course elasticities are smaller.
7 Conclusion
Typically, studies on the effect of school quality on academic outcomes do not take
account of students’ responses regarding academic effort or time use. Applying simple
parametric models we have shown that students’ effort or time-use responses to changes
in school quality may cause large differences between the total elasticity of changes in
school quality and the partial education production function elasticity (holding student
effort constant). The main parameters determining the sign of the elasticity difference
are the extent of substitution between effort and school quality in the production func-
tion and how kinked is the benefit from a higher mark in the student utility function. If
effort and school quality are substitutes in production and/or if there is a marked kink in
the benefit function, students will tend to reduce effort when school quality is increased
implying that the total elasticity is smaller than the partial elasticity. The value of the
elasticity difference also depends on the student’s distaste for effort, the curvature of the
production function with respect to effort and the student’s ability in the course of study.
In a model with two courses of study we have shown that an increase in school resources
in one course may reduce effort in that course, implying that the total ‘own-resource elas-
ticity’ is smaller than the partial own-resource elasticity, but increase effort in the other
course implying a positive (total) ‘cross elasticity’.
Our main conclusion is that reliable estimates of partial effects (based on educa-
tion production function parameters holding student effort constant) of school quality
on academic outcomes require - in addition to exogenous variation in school quality
- information on academic effort and/or time use. This suggests a new round of data
collection.
It is important to note that our models are very simple in several respects. For instance,
we focus on student effort response to a change of school quality and ignore parental
responses. Parental response is presumably very important for younger students. Thus,
our model is mostly relevant for older students (e.g. 15-year-olds). Another limitation
of our model is the assumption that school quality affects only the production function,
but not the student utility function. An important aspect of school (and teacher) qual-
ity is to motivate and monitor students better, inducing them to put more effort in their
school work. Thus, school quality may affect the parameters of the student utility func-
tion, but our model ignores this mechanism. In our model with two courses of study we
focus on mandatory courses and spill-over effects between these. It would be interesting
to extent the model to enable analysis of effects of changes in school quality and other
interventions on the choice between optional courses, and academic outcomes given
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8 Endnotes
1Studies on the effect of class size include, inter alia, Hanushek (1996), Krueger (1999,
2003), Angrist and Lavy (1999), Case and Deaton (1999), Hoxby (2000), Krueger and
Whitmore (2001), Heinesen (2010) and Fredriksson et al. (2013). Studies on the effect of
teacher quality include Rockoff (2004), Rivkin et al. (2005), Aaronson et al. (2007) and
Clotfelter et al. (2007a, 2007b, 2010). Other measures of school quality used in the
literature include expenditure per student and the teacher-student ratio (see e.g. the
surveys in Hanushek 1996, Card and Krueger 1996, and Betts 1996) and the number of
teacher hours per student (Browning and Heinesen 2007).
2In the vastly simplified framework below we consider only a school that has one class.
A more general model would distinguish between class quality and school quality and
allow for student selection based on within school quality differences.
3We use Greek letters to denote preference and prodcution parameters and Latin
letters to denote choice variables. Thus s is the choice of the school funding authorities.
As discussed in the Introduction, we ignore parental effort as an input in the production
function which means that the model is more relevant for older students.
4Houtenville and Conway (2008) note that school resources and parental inputs may
be substitutes in education production.
5It is straightforward to allow for alternative uses of time such as market work. This
complicates the notation and analysis without adding much of significance to the main
points.
6Results are qualitatively the same for other values of λ.
7Choosing other values of s produces qualitatively similar results.
8The production functions and indifference curves of Figure 1 are based on the
parametric model above and the four sets of parameters of Tables 2 and 3 (the upper
panels of Figure 1 correspond to Table 2 and the lower panels to table 3).






< 0 ⇔ 1 + y∗ > 0, and that this inequality
holds because of the restriction  ≥ −1/μ.
10The elasticities are calculated at λ = 0.4 and s1 = s2 = 0.5.
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